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Abstract: 
That the lack of competitiveness of EU Member States in the wake of the 
globalisation era was a problem from the start of EMU is clear from the various 
interventions on this issue by the European institutions. These started from the 
White paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, of 1993, up to the 
various versions of the Lisbon agenda and agenda 2020.  
It might even be possible to hypothesise, in line with Colin Crouch and the 
literature on the political economy of competitiveness, that the establishment of 
EMU was an attempt made by the dominant socio-economic sectors of the 
Member States to regain some of the competitiveness lost with the advent of the 
globalisation era. 
Accordingly, the role of the ECB to save the Euro-zone dominant socio-
economic sectors has been divided into two phases. In the first phase, the strategy 
was to rely on the depreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis the dollar, which indeed gave 
some results in the first years of life of the European currency. 
This leaves open the question of EU competitiveness to the present day, or 
better to the days of the global financial crisis.  
With respect to this, it is undeniable that the burden of the costs of the 
global financial crisis was inflicted on the weakest countries of the system, 
through the two related phenomena of the sovereign debt crisis and the ensuing 
austerity programmes. This is very far from configuring that solidarity between 
the EU Member States often recalled in the literature which could only be 
achieved by the establishment of a true federalist fiscal system, a system that, at 
the moment, is not even at the stage of infancy.  
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The real problem of the Euro-zone from the start: inflation or 
competitiveness? 
The emphasis of the European Treaties and institutions at the start of the Economic 
and Monetary Union concentrated above all on the inflation rate, particularly the need to 
keep inflation stable. Despite this, the real problem affecting the Euro area even then 
was clearly not inflation.  
At the onset of the Euro-zone, in 1999, the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP), the primary concern of the newly established ECB, was at an unprecedented 
low of 0.8%, configuring the possibility of deflation.   
 
Figure 0-1: HICP in euro-area (% changes) 1998-1999 
 
 
 
Source: ECB  
On the other hand, the recently established Euro-zone was experiencing the 
highest aggregate unemployment rate since the 1930s. This was compounded by a 
marked slowing of the GDP, contrary to the United States, which was characterised by a 
persistence of unusually high levels of growth.  
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Figure 0-2: Unemployment rates 1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure 0-3 Euro-area GDP % changes 1998-1999 
Source: ECB 
 
The situation was particularly worrisome in Italy, which had been happily ousted 
from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
in September 1992. This event allowed some breathing space to a country that had lost 
most of its competitiveness due to its permanence in the ERM.  
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By 1999, the state of the economy was not only serious in Italy, where 
unemployment was approaching 12% and GDP growth had fallen to only 0.8% in 1999; 
but also in Germany, where unemployment exceeded 9% and GDP growth fell from 2% 
in 1998 to 0.6% in 1999; and in France as well, where unemployment was at 11% and 
GDP growth slowed from 3.4 in 1998 to 2.1 in the second quarter of 1999. 
 
 
Table 0-1: GDP growth and unemployment in the euro-area 1998-1999 
 
 Unemployment rate (%) GDP growth rate (%) 
 98 99 98 99-Q1 99-Q2 
Austria 4.7 4.3 3.3 1.7 1.7 
Belgium 9.5 9 2.9 1.7 1.7 
Finland 11.4 10 5.6 3.4 3.3 
France 11.7 11 3.4 2.4 2.1 
Germany 9.4 9.1 2 0.6 0.6 
Ireland 7.8 6.7 8.9   
Italy 11.9 11.4 1.3 0.8 0.8 
Netherlands 4 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 
Spain 18.8 15.6 4 3.2 3.6 
Portugal 5.1 4.8 3.5   
Source: Eurostat 
Note: Greece is not included in the table because in the year 1999 it was not yet part of the Euro-area. 
 
That the problem of the future Euro-zone would be competitiveness much more 
than the inflation rate was indeed very clear also to the European Institutions. The 
European Commission had already published the “White paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment” in 1993 which claimed that:  
 
“Increasing the rate of growth which the economy of the Community can sustain 
for many years and boosting the employment content of growth requires a 
strategy based on three inseparable elements: 
 
1. The creation and the maintenance of a macroeconomic framework which, instead of 
constraining market forces, as often happened in the recent past, supports them; 
2. Determined actions in the structural area aimed at increasing the competitiveness of 
European industry and removing the rigidities which are curbing its dynamism and 
preventing it from reaping the full benefits of the internal market; an adequate 
framework for developing new market opportunities should be created; 
3. Active policies and structural changes in the labour markets and in the regulations 
limiting the expansion of certain sectors (notably the service sector) which will 
make it easier to employ people and will therefore increase the employment content 
of growth.1” 
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Although a lot of emphasis was then placed on an employment strategy resting 
upon the elimination of the rigidities of the labour markets, the need to boost the 
competitiveness of the EU still did not disappear from the rhetoric of EU institutions. 
Calls for full support to structural changes aimed at improving competitiveness at both 
the national and the European level were duly reiterated in the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting at Essen in December 19942.  
After the White Paper and the Essen agreement, the European Council meeting in 
Florence on June 1996 also focused on the subject of growth and employment3 calling 
on the social partners to continue to promote a wage policy favourable to employment 
and competitiveness4. A brand new title on employment by the EC Amsterdam Treaty5 
somehow abandoned the emphasis on competitiveness marking the final shift towards 
the liberal approach to employment that had taken place since the White Paper and the 
Essen European Council decisions. 6  
However, with the Lisbon strategy, competitiveness re-gained centre stage in the 
strategic vision of the European institutions. At Lisbon 2000, the European Union set a 
new, strategic aim to be achieved by 2010:  becoming the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. Not only should full employment be 
achieved, defined as raising the total EU employment rate to 70% and increasing the 
number of women in employment to more than 60% by 2010;7 but this should also be 
carried out by innovative means and with social cohesion. The Lisbon strategy hinged 
on economic and social pillars. The economic pillar stressed the importance for the EU 
to create the basis for a transition to a competitive, dynamic knowledge-based economy, 
emphasising in particular the role of the information society and research and 
development to improve the competitive position of Europe. The social pillar was aimed 
at modernizing the European social model, boosting human resources and fighting 
against social exclusion. The Gothenburg European Council meeting in June 2001 even 
added an environmental pillar inserting a new sustainable dimension to economic 
growth based on natural resource utilisation8.  
The progressive and forward-looking elements of the Lisbon strategy, however, 
were not destined to be implemented, and the programme was progressively voided of 
any substance simply becoming ancillary to the restructuring of labour markets and 
even austerity9. 
As Torres and Bongardt put it: 
 
“It is probably fair to say that the more immediate concerns with economic 
results somewhat eclipsed long-term sustainability concerns and their implications 
for future growth in the EU policy discussion (Bongardt and Torres 2016:34).” 
 
Already in the Stockholm European Council in 2001 it was clear that the aim of 
full employment by 2010 through innovation and research and development policy was 
unachievable. Consequently, the Barcelona Council in March 2002, although it 
confirmed that full employment was the overarching goal of the EU, auspicated that the 
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Lisbon strategy relied on a reinforced employment strategy. After the mid-term review 
of the Lisbon strategy by Mr. Kok, in February 2005, the Commission presented a 
communication on growth and jobs which proposed a new start in which much less 
emphasis would be placed on innovation and sustainable development and much more 
on delivering the two goals of more robust and lasting growth and more and better jobs 
(Bongardt and Torres 2016:34). Finally, as part of the so-called Agenda 2020, the EU 
set, as a target for employment, that by 2020 75% of people aged between 20 and 64 
should be in work10. 
Clearly, the Lisbon Strategy, especially in its original version, was meant to 
relaunch the EU within a changed context of global competition. This required a shift to 
a new sustainable development model based on the information society, innovation and 
the knowledge economy. In this way, the reasons for the enhanced importance of 
competitiveness in the debate from the 1990s onwards cannot be disentangled from the 
process of globalisation11. 
However, that EMU would pose more challenges to the competitiveness of the 
Euro-zone was clear from the start. As any standard handbook of macroeconomics 
would underline, the costs and benefits of currency unions depend on whether the 
chosen currency area meets the requirements of an optimum currency area (OCA) or a 
sustainable currency area. If this is not the case, as scholars almost unanimously portray 
the case of the EMU, then the adoption of a single currency with a related loss of 
exchange rate controls deeply modifies the competitiveness of the member states12.  
The reminder of this article is therefore devoted to addressing the question of how 
the main socio-economic sectors within the most important EU member states have 
tried to exploit the process of European monetary integration to enhance their 
competitive position not only in the context of the EU, but also in the global arena. To 
this aim, the article will focus on the role played by the ECB. It will first analyse how 
the ECB’s monetary policy in the first years of the EMU and exchange rate policy of 
‘benign neglect’ vis-à-vis devaluation of the exchange rate tried precisely to address the 
need to enhance the competitiveness problem of relevant members of the Euro-area. In 
the second part, the role played by the ECB in the crisis of the Euro-zone and after, with 
the enacting of the QE will be studied. The aim is to address to what extent the ECB, 
more than worrying about monetary stability helped the leading socio-economic sectors 
in the Euro-zone to regain competitiveness. 
 
The ECB: neo-liberalism but not against the leading socio-economic 
groups!  
Although the literature widely portrays the European Central Bank as the most evident 
example of neo-liberal ideology,13 a different interpretation of the first years of its 
monetary policy making may be proposed.14 It is certainly true that the ECB is a unique 
monetary institution, in charge of the implementation of the monetary policy of a 
common currency area lacking full political and fiscal integration. Consequently, there 
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were many worries about the performance of the ECB at the moment of its 
establishment.  These were expressed with respect to the credibility of the ECB’s 
monetary stance, to a lack of democratic accountability, transparency and flexibility as 
well as its capacity to withstand the pressures coming from the governments of Euro-
area Member States, especially the most powerful ones.  
Indeed, although the ECB is one of the most independent of all central banks15, pursuing 
the only aim to ensure price stability defined by its statute as an HICP of below 2%, it is 
possible to outline a more intergovernmentalist understanding of the working of this 
institution. In fact, although, the independence from political constraints, both national 
and supranational, allowed central bankers to concentrate theoretically only on 
monetary variables, in practice, the reality of the monetary policy implemented by the 
ECB in its first years demonstrates that considerations about the performance of real 
variables, especially in some Euro-area Member States, have played a significant role. 
An early contribution by the CEPR,16 already pointed out how the ECB displayed 
much more flexibility than expected from the start, at the expenses of transparency. This 
was possible thanks to the adoption of a so-called “two pillar” monetary policy strategy. 
Instead of targeting directly the level of prices, as has been customary in other 
institutional settings, the two pillar monetary strategy is a policy based on targeting the 
growth of M3 to achieve the aim of an HICP between 0 and 2%. Such monetary 
targeting represents the first pillar of the monetary strategy, the second being a number 
of unspecified indicators, including the exchange rates and asset prices, which the ECB 
evaluates in order to decide whether or not to intervene. Such an approach also makes it 
very difficult to understand the motivations behind any decisions of the ECB, and, 
therefore, makes them far less likely to be put under scrutiny by public opinion, 
politicians and even the markets. Summing up, in the trade off-between transparency 
and flexibility, the adoption of the two-pillar monetary strategy clearly favours 
flexibility. If this is the case, the first issue to assess is the importance the ECB 
attributed to exports and growth in the Euro-area, especially in some countries, as 
opposed to price stability.  
As noted at the start of this article, at the beginning of EMU the European 
economies where experiencing a serious downturn. Just as Japan had already been in 
recession for some year, and the US saw its first fall in the growth rate after a decade in 
2001, also the euro-zone slowed significantly in 2001 (Figure 7.1). Such a slow-down 
was particularly marked in the three most important export oriented economies of the 
Euro-zone: Germany, France and Italy (Figure 7.2). 
 
Figure 7.1 Real GDP % changes, 1999–2004 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
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Figure 7.2 Output gaps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
Although, in theory, the ECB should have paid little attention to the performance of the 
real economy and, therefore, geared its monetary policy only towards achieving the aim 
of price stability through the two pillar monetary policy, many analyses17 at the time 
underlined how this was not the case in practice.  
The CEPR (2002), for example, clearly shows that interest rate changes by the 
ECB during this period reflected the aim of output stabilisation and not that of simply 
controlling inflation, despite the constant denials of its members (CEPR 2002). The 
lowering of the interest rate by 30 points on the 1st of January 1999 could only be 
justified by concerns about the deflationary pressures of the Asian crisis. Moreover, the 
cutting the interest rates to 2.5% in April 1999 was associated with the fall in output 
rates of major Euro-zone countries, particularly Germany. Last but not least, the ECB 
reacted to the terrorist attacks of September the 11th by reducing the cut the minimum 
bid rate on the euro-system’s main refinancing operation by 50 points to 3.75 on 17 
September 2001 (ECB, Monthly Bulletin, various issues).  
Where does this leave the two pillar monetary policy strategy and, in particular, 
the monetary growth target? Officially, the target for M3 growth should have been the 
main reference for ECB monetary policy decisions. However, the M3 growth target, 
publicly set at 4.5 per cent, was constantly overshot in the first years from the 
establishment of EMU without producing any cuts in the ECB refinancing rates, nor, for 
that matter, any reactions by financial markets. Quite to the contrary, the ECB, instead 
of increasing the interest rates sometimes even cut them in the face of increasing M3 
growth.  
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From the figure below, comparing M3 growth, HICP and the ECB main 
refinancing rates, it is possible to note how the monetary aggregate managed to be 
below the threshold of 4.5% only for a very short period between September 2000 and 
June 2001, when it started increasing constantly. Paradoxically, however, precisely at 
the same time the ECB started cutting its MRR, the HICP decreased! It might be argued 
that there is a time lag between the increase in M3 growth and the increase in prices, but 
until at least March 2003, i.e., two years later, such a lag had not manifested itself as the 
inflation rate for the Euro-area did not increase, remaining comfortably around 2%, 
while the MRR decreased abundantly. There seems to be indeed little relation between 
how M3 growth performed, how the HICP changed and, also, how the ECB decided to 
set its interest rates. 
It is no surprise that, as a result, the experts legitimately suspected that the M3 
target was never really given the importance implicit in the adoption of the ‘two-pillar’ 
strategy, whereas pragmatic considerations about the level of output clearly prevailed.  
Given this lack of reliance on the first pillar of the monetary strategy, the ECB 
first reacted by modifying the way in which it calculated M3 growth, and then 
abandoned the 4.5% target altogether, avoiding to specify any target for the growth of 
the monetary aggregate. 
 
Figure 7.3 M3, HICP and ECB main refinancing rate % changes, 1999–2003 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
As far as the second pillar of the monetary strategy is concerned, its role in the 
monetary policy of the ECB is also not very clear.18 In theory, a set of indicators should 
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be assessed by the ECB to ascertain to what extent the economies of the Euro-zone are 
likely to overheat and, therefore, bring about a higher level of prices. Among such a set 
of indicators is the Euro-exchange rate, whose depreciation should signal to the ECB the 
possibility of an increase of the inflation rate. However, although the Euro had been 
depreciating constantly in its first years from establishment, the Bank did not seem 
particularly worried and appeared to have adopted its attitude of benign neglect vis-à-vis 
the exchange rate of the Euro.19  
Between August 1999 and August 2000, the newly born Euro-zone currency lost 
around 15 per cent of its value vis-à-vis the dollar, losing parity in January 2000. The 
effective nominal and real exchange rate of the Euro decreased respectively by 11.3 and 
-10.1 in the same period, but the ECB did not react. This is particularly puzzling given 
the worries about the credibility of the monetary policy making of such a unique 
monetary institution that could have been threatened by a strong depreciation of the 
Euro. 
 
Figure 7.4  US$/euro exchange rates, 1999–2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ECB. 
 
Of course the ECB did stress that it was necessary to assess the performance of 
the currency in the long-run. And indeed, after a period of stability, the Euro did 
appreciate substantially vis-a-vis the dollar, although one might also talk about a strong 
depreciation of the dollar in the face of the first recessive wave in the US after more 
than a decade (see above).  
Despite this, this policy of benign-neglect lends itself to other interpretations.20 To 
cut the story short, it could be possible to interpret the ECB’s preference for a bit more 
flexibility in exchange of a bit less transparency as a pragmatic way to address the quest 
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for competitiveness of, in particular, the most powerful members of the Euro-zone and 
their leading socio-economic sectors. An objective that could hardly be considered 
acceptable given the ostensibly strict anti-inflationary mandate of the ECB.21 Within 
this context, and as suggested by Colin Crouch, the attitude of the ECB towards the 
performance of the exchange rate in the first two years from the establishment, an 
attitude that the economists at the time could hardly fully explain22, becomes much 
more intelligible especially by looking at the performance of the manufacturing export 
of the Euro-zone, and, in particular, of Italy, France and Germany23. It is indeed difficult 
to deny that the export-oriented manufacturing sectors gained the most from the initial 
depreciation of the Euro. 
Just to give an example, focusing on changes in the balance of trade in goods with 
the US between 1999 and 2001, Italy improved its trade balance from 0.7 per cent to 1.2 
per cent, France from -0.3 per cent to 0.55 per cent and Germany from 0.6 per cent to 
1.5 per cent (Talani 2014). However, as correctly predicted by Colin Crouch, this 
approach to increase the competitiveness of the export-oriented sectors of leading Euro-
zone countries could only work in the short run. The situation was soon reversed once 
the dollar started depreciating vis-à-vis the Euro, which came about as a consequence of 
the expansionary monetary policies adopted by the US to react to the recession of the 
early 2000s. It left Euro-zone countries with the problem of increasing economic 
competitiveness in the wake of increased globalisation of the world economy24.  
We move therefore to the next phase in the role played by the ECB to save the 
Euro-zone from a crisis of competitiveness. 
 
The ECB to the rescue of the Eurozone after the Global 
Financial crisis 
 
It should not surprise that the only effective policy able to stop speculation against 
the periphery of the Euro-area PIIGS could be the European Central Bank acting as a 
hidden lender of last resort and an open “saver” of last resort. As already noticed above, 
this kind of intervention by the ECB has been advocated widely in the literature25.  
Unfortunately, the European Central Bank is still far from becoming the official ‘lender 
of last resort’ of the euro area, as would be natural in any currency union. 
However, already in September 2008, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
ECB had started intervening by adopting a ‘non-conventional’ monetary policy 
alongside its standard measures. The non-standard approach to monetary policy 
inaugurated by Trichet immediately after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) became 
evident, relied initially on two programs: the ‘enhanced credit support (ECS)’ and the 
‘securities markets program (SMP)’. The first program includes two elements: (a) 
increasing the share of liquidity supplied at its long-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs) relative to its regular main refinancing operations (MROs); and (b) increasing 
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the maturity structure of its LTROs. The most important characteristic of this novel 
approach to monetary policy making is that ECB would provide re-financings on a 
‘fixed-rate full allotment’ basis, and not on a variable rate tender format as before. To 
be clear, this means that, contrary to what happened in normal times, all financial 
institutions could obtain all the liquidity they wanted at a fixed, and incredibly low, 
interest rate. In addition, the ECB would accept toxic assets (such as mortgage-backed 
securities) as collateral in its refinancing operations. Finally, the number of financial 
institutions eligible to be refinanced by the Eurosystem increased from 140 to around 
2000 and they were also protected by anonymity, ostensibly to avoid domino effects26. 
Since 2008, there have been two liquidity providing long-term re-financing 
operations in Euros with a three year maturity, one maturing on 29 January 2015 and 
one on 26 February 2015, together with US dollar liquidity providing operations. 
Similar operations were very interesting for the banking sector as they allowed it to 
borrow liquidity from the ECB at a very low interest rate (see figure below) and use the 
money to buy the sovereign debt of struggling countries bearing much higher interest 
rates, thus profiting from the difference. The consequences of this practice was on the 
one hand, that a lot of the sovereign debt of the countries in crisis ended up in the 
balance sheets of the banks, especially of the stronger member states. On the other hand, 
the banks had no incentive in financing the non-financial private sector, thus 
exacerbating the length and scope of the recession. For this reason, in June 2014 the EC 
announced a series of still ongoing in 2016 Targeted Longer Term Refinancing 
operations (TLTROs) aimed at increasing the liquidity of non-financial private actors27. 
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Date Deposit facility Main refinancing operations Marginal lending facility 
    
Fixed rate tenders  
Fixed rate  
Variable rate tenders  
Minimum bid rate  
  
With effect from   
2015 9 Dec. −0.30 0.05 - 0.30 
2014 10 Sep. −0.20 0.05 - 0.30 
  11 Jun. −0.10 0.15 - 0.40 
2013 13 Nov. 0.00 0.25 - 0.75 
  8 May. 0.00 0.50 - 1.00 
2012 11 Jul. 0.00 0.75 - 1.50 
2011 14 Dec. 0.25 1.00 - 1.75 
  9 Nov. 0.50 1.25 - 2.00 
  13 Jul. 0.75 1.50 - 2.25 
  13 Apr. 0.50 1.25 - 2.00 
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Source: ECB https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html 
as accessed on January, 20, 2016 
 
Moreover, always in in May 2009, the European Central Bank started a Covered 
Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) allocating 60bn Euros to buy both private and state 
euro-denominated covered bonds issued by European Area Member States (EAMS) 
until June 2010. In November 2011 a second Covered Bond Purchase Programme was 
announced28. The second set of non-standard measures initiated by the ECB to react to 
the crisis, apart from the enhanced credit support measures, was the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) launched in May 2010 at the onset of the Greek crisis. The SMP 
allowed the Eurosystem to purchase both private and public euro area debt. However 
this could be done only in secondary markets, fully sterilised and up to a weekly limit. 
This, instead of stopping market speculation, might have even stimulated it as by 
overcoming the weekly threshold just a bit they would beat the ECB and profit from 
speculation. In fact, only when Draghi announced on 6th September 2012 the 
replacement of the LTRO by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), which 
eliminated any limits to the purchase of bonds in secondary markets, the markets 
stopped going short on the sovereign debt of struggling countries. This happened more 
than two years after speculation had started. In other words, it took more than two years 
to the ECB to act as a pseudo “lender of last resort” thus managing to put an end to 
market speculation against the sovereign debt of the PIIGS.  
Although the OMT as well were conditional to the implementation of strict 
austerity measures by Member states in needs, de facto this was not a problem as the 
OMT in practice did not need to be ever activated. To stop speculation it was enough 
for the markets to know that the ECB would buy every single bond sold by speculators, 
thus making profits impossible. This, in the opinion of the author of this article, and 
contrary to Chang and Leblond (2013)29 does not signal the start of any solidarity by EU 
institutions in favour of the weaker countries, but the redressing of an evident anomaly, 
that is not having a lender of last resort for the Euro-zone. The real question is why this 
could happen and why only at such a late time. Regarding the first issue, why was the 
ECB allowed to intervene without limits, the intergovernmentalist explanation makes 
some sense as, as explained by Moravcsick (2012),30 Germany could hardly afford the 
collapse of the EMU at that time. Maybe things will be different with the forthcoming 
agreement on TTIP, but this is still a matter of speculation. However what is important 
is to understand is why intervention was allowed so late. With respect to this issue it 
seems that Gill’s (1997)31 neo-constitutionalism provides an extremely useful heuristic 
framework. Indeed, waiting until when the system was on the verge of collapse did 
naturally put a lot of pressure on the governments of the PIIGS to implement precisely 
those neo-liberal reforms which were so much supported by the transnationalist historic 
block as well as by the dominant national coalitions of interests. These reforms included 
the usual set of liberalisation and privatisation measures and, of course, further steps in 
the flexibilization of labour markets in all its dimensions, including reducing labour 
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protection and decreasing wages. The pressure exerted by the two years of emergency 
mode most definitely had an impact on the nature of the policies implemented by the 
governments under attack. Whether this was in the best interests of the given country or 
even of the capitalist class of that country remains to be seen. 
Indeed, the austerity promoted to react to the sovereign debt crisis ended up in 
deflation, which is most likely one of the worst nightmare of the capitalist class as it 
signals the contraction of demand and, consequently, the contraction of profits. Also in 
this case the ECB intervened, but, this time, without much of a lag, with the quantitative 
easing (QE) programme inaugurated by the ECB on January 22, 2015. This meant 
putting 60bn Euros a month into the system until at least September 2016, with the aim 
of stimulating growth and reversing deflation32. This form of intervention has been 
confirmed and increased to 80bn a month in March 201633. 
Regarding this it is important to note that, despite the fact the Euro-area had been 
in recession for quite some time, QE happened only when the spectre of deflation 
appeared all over Europe, and not before, when the burden of the global financial crisis 
was being shifted to the weaker countries and the weaker strata of the EU. Indeed it was 
precisely in 2015 that the HICP turned to 0 in the whole of the EU (see figure below). 
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
That the lack of competitiveness of EU Member States in the wake of the 
globalisation era was a problem from the start of EMU is clear from the various 
0
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HICP-Annual avg % change European Union (changing 
composition)
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interventions on this issue by the European institutions. These started from the 
White paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, of 1993, up to the 
various versions of the Lisbon agenda and agenda 2020.  
It might even be possible to hypothesise, in line with Colin Crouch and the 
literature on the political economy of competitiveness, that the establishment of 
EMU was an attempt made by the dominant socio-economic sectors of the 
Member States to regain some of the competitiveness lost with the advent of the 
globalisation era. 
Accordingly, the role of the ECB to save the Euro-zone dominant socio-
economic sectors has been divided into two phases. In the first phase, the strategy 
was to rely on the depreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis the dollar, which indeed gave 
some results in the first years of life of the European currency. 
This leaves open the question of EU competitiveness to the present day, or 
better to the days of the global financial crisis.  
With respect to this, it is undeniable that the burden of the costs of the 
global financial crisis was inflicted on the weakest countries of the system, 
through the two related phenomena of the sovereign debt crisis and the ensuing 
austerity programmes. This is very far from configuring that solidarity between 
the EU Member States often recalled in the literature which could only be 
achieved by the establishment of a true federalist fiscal system, a system that, at 
the moment, is not even at the stage of infancy.  
To be sure, and following Gill (1997), the main feature of the EU approach 
to crisis management was austerity and ‘internal devaluation’, with all that this 
mean in terms of increasing inequalities both socially and geographically. This 
happened despite the rhetoric about the establishment of a new economic 
governance, or the renewed neo-functionalist credo in the progress towards more 
integration, and was most likely done disingenuously to ‘discipline’ not only 
delinquent states, but also subordinated socio-economic groups. As it might be 
expected this disciplinary attitude did provoke some popular discontent, political 
instability and disintegration threats but they seem to have been silenced quickly. 
Only the ghost of deflation was really worrying the dominant transnationalist 
socio-economic coalition, but this was immediately dispelled by Draghi and his 
Quantitative Easing.   
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